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Paul Cilliers has developed a novel post-structural approach to complexity that has influenced 
several writers contributing to the current complexity literature. Concomitantly however, 
Cilliers advocates for modelling complex systems using connectionist neural networks (rather 
than analytic, rule-based models). In this paper, I argue that it is dilemmic to simultaneously 
hold these two positions. Cilliers’ post-structural interpretation of complexity states that 
models of complex systems are always contextual and provisional; there is no exclusive 
model of complex systems. This sentiment however appears at odds with Cilliers’ promotion 
of connectionist neural networks as the best way to model complex systems. The lesson is 
that those who currently follow Cilliers’ post-structural approach to complexity cannot also 
develop a preferred model of complex systems, and those who currently advocate for some 
preferred model of complex systems cannot adopt the post-structural approach to complexity 











It is generally recognised that one cannot model a complex system1 without losing certain 
features of that system. Those who adopt a Derridean post-structural approach to complexity 
are particularly concerned with this loss – this excess – of meaning and therefore knowledge 
(Cilliers 2016). Meaning in and knowledge of complex systems cannot be reduced to some 
simple algorithm or set of rules; complex systems are informationally incompressible 
(Cilliers 1998, 9-10; Woermann et al 2018; Preiser and Woermann 2019). In other words, 
complex systems cannot be reduced to simple models (otherwise they were not complex to 
begin with). Pockets of stability “make it possible to provisionally model a system”, but “any 
model is contingent upon the context under which it is established” (Woermann et al 2018, 9; 
see also Cilliers 2005). 
It should follow from this line of thinking that post-structural complexity theorists do not 
attempt to develop a specific (i.e. non-provisional, non-contextual) model of complex 
systems. One must either argue for model provisionality, contingency, contextuality etc and 
forgo model exclusivity or advocate for some specific model and forgo model provisionality, 
contingency, contextuality etc. However, we find this ostensibly dilemmic approach in the 
work of Paul Cilliers who originated the post-structural approach to complexity. He argues 
both for post-structuralist provisionality, contingency, contextuality etc and that connectionist 
neural networks are the best way to model complex systems. Cilliers considers connectionist 
models superior to rival models of complex systems, and this is in tension with post-
structural motifs of provisionality, contingency and the like, or so I will argue.  
This dilemmic aspect of Cilliers’ work has not been highlighted and thoroughly critiqued up 
until now, and this paper should therefore make a novel contribution to the complexity 
literature. It should be of particular interest to those contemporary writers – e.g. Human 
(Human and Cilliers 2013), Hurst (2010), Woermann (2016) and Preiser (2019) – who draw 
inspiration from Cilliers in continuing to develop the post-structural approach to complexity. 
It should also be of potential interest to those non-post-structural complexity theorists who 
                                                             
1 For the purposes of this paper, we can follow Richardson and Cilliers in defining a complex system as “a 
system that is comprised of a large number of entities that display a high level of nonlinear interactivity” (2001, 
8 emphasis removed). See however Cilliers (1998 ch 1) and Preiser (2019) for detailed lists of characteristics of 
complex systems. We can further define ‘complexity theory’ broadly as any practice that involves the attempt to 
gain knowledge and/or understanding of complex systems. A ‘complexity theorist’ is someone who engages in 
such a practice. 
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currently advocate for some specific model of complex systems but may be considering 
adopting the post-structural interpretation. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 1, I discuss how Derrida’s semantics 
influences Cilliers’ post-structural approach of complexity, specifically his modelling of 
complex systems. In section 2, I outline Cilliers’ conclusion that connectionist neural 
networks better model complex systems than what he calls analytic or rule-based models. In 
section 3, I highlight the dilemma that follows from concurrently holding the views discussed 
in the previous two sections; I also respond to three potential counter-arguments. Lastly, I 
conclude by outlining what implications my argument has for those currently engaged in the 
debate over the modelling of complex systems. This conclusion is twofold: 
1. Post-structural complexity theorists cannot propose that complex systems 
should be modelled some specific way rather than some other way. 
2.  Those who advocate for some specific model of complex systems – i.e. most 
scientists working on complex systems (see Morin 2007) – cannot adopt the post-
structural interpretation of complexity without giving up the purported objectivity 
and/or superiority of their preferred model. 
1. Derrida’s semantics and connectionist modelling 
Cilliers notices a synonymy between Derridean post-structural semantics and connectionist 
neural network models. Both emphasise processes and relations; both are dynamic and 
qualitative. Conversely, what Cilliers calls the analytic or rule-based approach to modelling 
complex systems is static, reductionist, algorithmic and quantitative (Cilliers 1998 ch 1; see 
also Woermann 2016 ch 1). Advocates of the analytic approach include Descartes, Newton, 
Chomsky, Fodor, Searle and Habermas (Cilliers 1998; see also Kauffmann 2019). For 
Cilliers, analytic approaches – reliant on strict measurement and deterministic rule-based 
methods – cannot model the subtle relational nature of truly complex systems such as 
language or the brain in the way that neural networks can. 
Rule-based models are strictly formal; they conform to a precise logic and consist of sets of 
symbols standing in logical relations (Cilliers 1998 ch 1). These symbols stand for only the 
“important” parts of the system being represented, says Cilliers, resulting in invariable loss of 
fidelity. The behaviour of a complex system is simplified or reduced to a set of rules that 
attempt to describe the system. Rule-based models also require a central controller – the 
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“meta-rules of the system” – that decides which rules should become active in the system. 
Importantly, “[i]f the central control fails, the whole system fails” (Cilliers 1998, 15). 
Conversely, connectionist neural networks are modelled on the brain which consists of 
neurons and synapses in rich, informational interrelations. Neural networks contain multiple 
densely interconnected processing nodes (viz. neurons). Each node is influenced by and 
influences multiple other nodes. Nodes usually form three layers: the input layer that receives 
data to be processed by the network; the output layer that presents the output of the network’s 
computations; and one or more hidden layers that form associations between the input layer 
and the output layer (and do not have any link to the outside of the network). Information 
flows from the input layer through the hidden layer/s to the output layer. According to 
Buckner and Garson, 
[i]f a neural net were to model the whole human nervous system, the input units 
would be analogous to the sensory neurons, the output units to the motor neurons, and 
the hidden units to all other neurons (2019, np). 
Each node (whether in the input, hidden or output layer) has a certain activation value 
determined by the information it receives. Above a certain threshold value, it will ‘fire’ and 
send information (determined by its input) to the next node; below the threshold value, it will 
remain dormant. The links between nodes have a certain numerical value or weight that 
represents the strength of that link. The sum of the inputs determines the output of the node 
which in turn influences the activation value of the next node and so on. All the nodes in the 
network are processing in parallel, and the values of the weights rather than features of the 
nodes determine the characteristics of the network. 
When training neural networks, all the weights and thresholds are set to random values. 
Training examples are fed to the input layer and propagate through the network giving some 
random output. The weights and thresholds are then continuously adjusted until certain kinds 
of inputs reliably generate certain kinds of desired outputs. After some time, the network 
should be able to generalize these input/output computations to examples not in the original 
training set. Thus, concludes Cilliers,  
a network provided with enough examples of the problem it has to solve will generate 
the values of the weights by itself... It ‘evolves’ in the direction of a solution... The 
value of any specific weight has no significance; it is the patterns of weight values in 
the whole system that bear information. Since these patterns are complex, and are 
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generated by the network itself... there is no abstract procedure available to describe 
the process used by the network to solve the problem. There are only complex 
patterns of relationships (1998, 28).2 
Let us now briefly survey Saussure’s structural semantics (section 1.1), then look at Derrida’s 
transformation of Saussure’s structural semantics into a post-structural semantics (section 
1.2). This exposition is necessary to understand which aspects of post-structuralism Cilliers 
considers informative to complexity studies. Before turning to Cilliers’ argument that 
connectionist models are superior to rule-based models of complex systems, we also discuss 
three core concepts Cilliers adopts from Derrida to inform his post-structural understanding 
of complex systems; these are openness, trace and différance (section 1.3). 
1.1. Saussure’s structural semantics 
For Saussure (e.g. 1974), the meaning of a linguistic sign (composed of signifier and 
signified) is determined by how it differs from all the other signs in a linguistic system. We 
can think of a sign as a semantic node in a relational network. The sign does not determine 
the relations however; instead, the sign is the result of – it ‘emerges’ from – the relations. 
Further, the linguistic system changes as a result of its contingent and contextual use by a 
community of speakers and not by the decree of a central dictator or telos.  
Saussure’s influence has spread through the humanities (see Joseph 1995 for an overview). 
Barthes (1972) notably reinvented Saussurean signs as interwoven narratives or “myths” that 
constitute the saturated cultural milieu surrounding us moment-to-moment. Saussure’s 
linguistics, in its original form, has however fallen out of favour since the mid-20th century. 
The post-structuralist tradition in philosophy, of which Derrida and Cilliers are part, has – as 
the name suggests – largely superseded Saussure’s structuralism.3 
For Cilliers, Saussurean models consisting of discrete signs are “somewhat ‘rigid’” and  
Derrida’s transformation of the system by means of a sophisticated description of how 
the relationships interact in time… provides us with an excellent way of 
                                                             
2 See Cilliers (1998 ch 2) and Buckner and Garson (2019) for more detail on neural networks. 
3 Lazard is however a notable exception. Using the Saussurean approach, he attempts to develop a science of 
linguistics or what he calls “pure linguistics” (e.g. Lazard 2014) where a language can be an ideal object of 
genuine scientific investigation, as are biological species, a pure body and a perfect gas. 
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conceptualising the dynamics of complex systems from a philosophical perspective 
(1998, 37 emphasis removed; see also Dillon 2000). 
In Saussurean models each word has its place and its meaning in a mostly stable linguistic 
system. Although the system evolves, it remains in a relatively steady state near equilibrium. 
According to Cilliers, this is not how linguistic systems and complex systems in general 
behave. Derrida’s critique and adaptation of Saussure better capture the non-linear and 
dynamic nature of complex systems (see also Preiser et al 2013, 262 and Woermann 2016, 
134-135). 
1.2. Derrida’s post-structural semantics 
In Saussure’s model the meaning of a sign is present to a speaker. The meaning of language 
is grounded in the subjectivity of the community of speakers using that language. Derrida 
argues however that the meaning of signs is ungrounded, unstable and unpredictable; there is 
always excess of meaning. As Cilliers puts it, 
the signified (or ‘mental’ component) never has any immediate self-present meaning. 
It is itself only a sign that derives its meaning from other signs. Such a viewpoint 
entails that the sign is, in a sense, stripped of its ‘signified’ component (1998, 42; see 
also Woermann 2016, 72). 
For Derrida, there is only the endless interaction of signifiers (the ‘physical’ component of 
the sign), and the subject itself is constituted by this play of signifiers (Cilliers 1998, 43). 
Meaning is never immediately given; there is always interpretation, and interpretation is 
always limited. This is Derrida’s famous deconstruction of the sign (see Lawlor 2021 for 
detail).4   
Each time a sign is used, it interacts with the other nodes in the linguistic network, and this 
semantic interplay shifts the meaning of the sign (see Preiser et al 2013). For Derrida and 
                                                             
4 According to Cilliers, post-structural deconstruction involves 
showing the contradictions that result from fixing the boundaries [of a complex system] from one 
perspective. Pointing out the contradictions that follow from such a closure is an activity that Derrida 
calls ‘deconstruction’ (1998, 81). 
Deconstruction is not an action performed by a deconstructor on a system. Instead, “[i]nterventions from the 
outside enter into the play of differences always already at work in the system” (Cilliers 2010, 15). Derrida, says 




Cilliers, language is in a sense alive. It mutates, adapts and evolves; it acts on and reacts to its 
environment (including other languages). Like any complex system, a living language is in a 
state far from equilibrium, and if “language is closed off, if it is formalised into a stable 
system in which meaning is fixed, it will die...” (Cilliers 1998, 124; see also Cilliers 2016).  
1.3. Openness, trace and différance 
Openness  
For Derrida and Cilliers, language and meaning are not closed off from the world; semantics 
cannot be pulled apart from metaphysics, and we cannot describe the world in any complete, 
finite way (Derrida 1976, 35; Cilliers 1998 ch 3). The same applies to complex systems: we 
cannot identify their boundaries in a way that is objective or complete. Complex systems are 
entwined with their environment which is itself a complex system composed of complex 
systems. 
Delineating complex systems involves only a provisional, conceptual or heuristic 
demarcation; 
[w]hat occurs inside our models cannot be easily separated from what is excluded 
because what we exclude from our models constitutes them as much as that which is 
included (Human and Cilliers 2013, 29; see also Morin 2007, 2008 ch 2 and Hurst 
2010). 
Citing Cilliers, Woermann et al state, “our models are distorted... models are static 
representations of a necessarily fluid reality” (2018, 10). As mentioned in the introduction, 
for post-structural complexity theorists, we cannot get a semantic or epistemic fix on complex 
systems. Thus, instead of trying to decomplexify complexity, we should “abandon our 
reductionist tendencies” and “learn to dance with” complexity (Woermann 2016, 42; see also 
Cilliers 2005 and Hurst 2010). Post-structuralism suggests a “‘playful’ approach”, writes 
Cilliers, 
[w]hen dealing with complex phenomena, no single method will yield the whole truth. 
Approaching a complex system playfully allows for different avenues of advance, 
different viewpoints, and, perhaps, a better understanding of its characteristics 
(Cilliers 1998, 23). 
In other words, we cannot semantically or epistemically capture – i.e. model – complex 




Derrida calls the relationship between any two signs in a semantic system a trace. An 
individual trace does not have meaning in and of itself; instead, meaning emerges through the 
interaction of traces (Derrida 1982, 3-27; Cilliers 2010). Cilliers equates Derrida’s traces with 
connectionist weights in a neural network: 
The significance of a node in a network is not a result of some characteristic of the 
node itself; it is a result of the pattern of weighted inputs and outputs that connects the 
node to other nodes (Cilliers 1998, 81). 
Likewise, no individual weight in a neural network has meaning; meaning is constituted by 
multiple interactions in the system. “Because of the ‘distributed’ nature of these relationships, 
a specific weight has no ideational content”; it “only gains significance in large patterns of 
interaction” (Cilliers 1998, 46). 5  In other words, all the small meaningless differences 
between the many components in a complex system comingle to engender the emergence of 
meaning within the system.  
According to Cilliers, the patterns of activity generated in a complex system cause traces of 
that activity to reverberate through the system. These patterns of traces collectively constitute 
the overall behaviour of the system. Moreover, a complex system is continuously being 
transformed by both its environment and itself. The system is  
constituted only by the distributed interaction of traces in a network... there is nothing 
outside the system of signs which could determine the trace, since the ‘outside’ itself 
does not escape the logic of the trace (Cilliers 1998, 82).  
This entwinement of system and environment deconstructs the conventional binary of inside 
versus outside the system; the traditional gap between the two collapses. That is, traces ripple 
and recoil – they dance – through the system; they are “reflected back after a certain 
propagation delay (deferral), and alter (make different) the activity that produced them in the 
first place” (Cilliers 1998, 46).  
Différance  
Although reluctant to define différance, Derrida suggests at times that his famous concept 
qua non-concept is “the process of scission and division... an expenditure without reserve, as 
                                                             




the irreparable loss of presence... that apparently interrupts every economy” (1982, 8-19), i.e. 
every complex system (see also Human and Cilliers 2013; Preiser et al 2013). For Cilliers, 
différance is 
a concept that indicates difference and deference, that is suspended between the 
passive and active modes, and that has both spatial and temporal components (2010, 
7; see Derrida 1982, 1-27). 
In the context of complexity theory, Woermann thinks of différance as the play of disorder 
and entropy within a complex system (2016, 64). Différance constitutes the activity of 
multitudinous traces: the exuberant and limitless play of differences. Différance disrupts, 
displaces and defers apparent closure of order, logic, meaning and knowledge (Woermann 
2016, 100-104; Woermann et al 2018). The play of différance through and between complex 
systems constitutes their meaning and this can never be epistemically captured by formal 
methods. Différance “signifies the irreparable loss of meaning”; it “threatens the total 
ruination of meaning” (Woermann 2016, 100; see also Preiser 2019).  
For Cilliers, différance describes the dynamics of a complex system. It is not simply part of 
the activity of a system; “it constitutes the system” (2010, 15). We can say that the play of 
différance determines the structure or organisation of the system; the complexity of the 
system is a function of différance’s dynamics. 
Having discussed how Cilliers imports Derrida’s post-structural semantics into complexity 
theory, let us now look at his proceeding conclusion that connectionist models are better 
suited to modelling complex systems than rule-based models.  
2. Therefore, connectionist models trump rule-based models 
Cilliers prefers (post-structural) connectionist models to (analytic) rule-based models because 
of their avowed ability to capture the contingent, evolutionary nature of complex systems. 
Moreover, neural networks are based on the most complex of all known systems: the brain 
(Cilliers 1998, 112).6 Like complex systems, neural networks have no central controller; 
“[p]rocessing is distributed over the network and the roles of the various components (or 
groups of components) change dynamically” (Cilliers 1998, 19). Neural networks can also 
                                                             




learn to perform complex tasks either when shown examples of these tasks successfully 
performed, or by using criteria internal to the network that signal success.7  
Neural networks are mostly self-contained, says Cilliers, they require only a sensor that 
inputs information to the network and a motor that allows the output of the system to have 
some external effect (1998, 18). Inside the network there are only neurons responding to and 
influencing other neurons locally. The behaviour of the system is determined only by the 
values of its weights. Each neuron is simple, but the system of neurons as a whole can exhibit 
highly complex behaviour.8  
Neural networks can also cope with contradictory information; they are “robust”. Part of the 
strength of neural networks, says Cilliers, is that they can often bypass a contradiction by 
redistributing the weight in the system (1998, 19-21). Rule-based systems conversely are 
“brittle”; they “blow up” when given contradictory information.9  
3. The problem with Cilliers’ approach to complexity 
As we have seen, Cilliers argues that using neural networks is the best way to model complex 
systems while concurrently arguing that post-structuralist semantics shows that there are no 
general models for complex systems. In this section, I suggest that it is dilemmic to do so 
(section 3.1); I then engage with three potential counter-arguments (section 3.2). 
3.1. Cilliers’ dilemma 
As Cilliers recognises, modelling necessarily involves a simplification or reduction of the 
system being modelled; “we have to reduce... complexity when we try to understand it” 
(Cilliers and Preiser 2010, vii; see also Cilliers and Human 2013). A fortiori, this reduction 
applies equally to analytic and connectionist models. Although Cilliers does not explicitly 
                                                             
7 Cilliers also emphasises two “indispensable capabilities” of complex systems. A complex system must “be 
able to store information concerning the environment for future use; and it must be able to adapt its structure 
when necessary” (Cilliers 1998, 10). The first capability is representation and the second self-organisation. 
According to Cilliers, connectionist models of complex systems correctly capture these capabilities (1998 chs 1-
2). 
8 To perform their function, neural networks also cannot be too small (too few neurons) or too large (too many 
neurons), and they must not be under- or over-trained. Some noise should also be added to the input of the 
network to increase its robustness. (Cilliers 1998, 74-79). 
9 Smolensky (1987) thinks of rule-based symbol systems as “hard” and connectionist systems as “soft” (see also 
Cilliers 1998, 34). 
11 
 
state as much, connectionist modelling clearly involves a reduction of complex systems to 
simple or simpler neural networks (consisting of nodes, weights etc). As we have seen 
however, Cilliers advocates for this connectionist reductionism while concurrently 
advocating for Derridean anti-reductionism.  
Cilliers states further that “complexity is ‘incompressible’” (1998, 24); “[r]eduction of 
complexity always leads to distortion” (2000a, 9-10). However, we are also told that 
connectionist neural networks are the best way to model – i.e. compress/reduce – complex 
systems. Cilliers also argues that a post-structural understanding of complexity shows that 
reductive strategies are “seriously flawed” (2010, 4; see also Woermann 2016, 31-31 and 
Preiser 2019). If so, it follows that Cilliers’ own connectionist strategy is seriously flawed, 
and thereby inept at modelling complex systems. De Villiers-Botha and Cilliers likewise 
argue that one cannot replace a complex system with some simpler system without losing 
“vital characteristics of the system” (2010, 29). It should follow that connectionist models 
lose vital characteristics of their target system.  
Cilliers claims further that models are always indexed to some contingent framework, and 
that the success of a model will depend on the norms or values operant in that framework 
(Cilliers 2000b, 45-46; see also Cilliers and Human 2013). There are no objectively correct 
models of complex systems; there are no meta-narratives expressed from meta-perspectives 
(Woermann and Cilliers 2012, 458-450). However, at other times, Cilliers argues that we 
should employ 
post-structural perspectives (mainly those of Derrida) in order to show that the 
intricate and dynamic network of relationships between the components of a complex 
system can be understood better in terms of connectionist (or neural network) models 
(Cilliers 2000b, 40). 
Cilliers seem to be arguing both for and against contingency, perspectivism and objectivity 
about modelling complex systems.10 This suggests a logical tension at the core of his general 
account of complex systems.  
Interestingly, Holland argues that connectionist models are – at bottom – themselves rule-
based; the functioning of neural networks is based on the workings of Hebb’s rule (Holland 
                                                             
10 Morçöl criticises Cilliers along similar lines (Morçöl 2001, 117-118). 
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1998, 81-114).11 If so, then Cilliers’ connectionism is subject the very criticism he levels 
against rule-based models. Cilliers however argues against Holland that Hebb’s ‘rule’ is, in 
fact, not a rule at all; it is instead a kind of low-level principle. Citing Winston (1971), 
Cilliers posits two features that constitute a rule:  
1. A rule implies a certain generality; a specific case where the rule applies must 
be generalisable to many cases.  
2. Rules must be suitably linked: the output of one rule must serve as the input 
for the next rule. That is, a system of rules must be algorithmic (Cilliers 2000b, 44-
45). 
For Cilliers, this characterisation of a rule is at odds with a nonalgorithmic principle like 
Hebb’s rule. Hebb’s ‘rule’, says Cilliers, in fact functions at the level of Derrida’s trace. It 
only applies to local interactions between components of a complex systems. It operates on 
low-level, contingent information, and is non-selective. The ‘rule’ operates everywhere in all 
connectionist networks; it does not tell us anything essential about a specific complex system 
nor make any generalisations about complex systems.  
In any event, neural networks are still clearly simpler that the complex systems they purport 
to model; they are still a reduction of complexity (Holland 1998, 24). If they were not, we 
would not be able to comprehend them or work with them; the model would be as complex as 
what it attempts to model. As noted, modelling – whether by way of analytic rules or neural 
networks – by definition involves a reduction of complexity so that the subject matter at hand 
can be understood and managed.  
In sum, Cilliers faces a dilemma. On the one horn, if he claims that the connectionist 
approach to modelling complex systems is the correct one, then he contradicts post-structural 
themes of perspectivism, contingency and the like. On the other horn, if he claims that 
models of complex systems are relative to perspectives, always contingent and so on, then he 
contradicts his claim for the correctness of connectionist models of complex systems.12  
                                                             
11 Hebb’s rule describes the local interaction between neurons responsible for the organization of structure in a 
neural network; it states that “the connection strength between two neurons will increase if the two neurons are 
active simultaneously” (Cilliers 2000b, 44 fn 8). 




3.2. Possible responses 
Cilliers may respond that connectionism is the best way to model complex systems given the 
scientific paradigm we currently occupy even if there is no absolute fact of the matter. There 
are no meta-models or meta-perspectives, but some norms or methods are more “long-lived” 
than others due to provisional, contingent or heuristic factors (Cilliers 2016, 92-94; see also 
Hurst 2010). However, by reductio, it should then follow that our best scientific models – e.g. 
in quantum theory, general relativity and the theory of natural selection – are ultimately no 
better than those employed in pseudo-sciences such as astrology, Scientology or creation 
biology. All are in the end equally provisional; the only reason we prefer the former is due to 
our currently dominant contingent norms. It would be grossly counter-intuitive to assert as 
much; one wonders whether post-structural complexity theorists are prepared to bite this 
bullet. 
A second possible objection is that there are two domains of applicability when it comes to 
understanding complex systems. At times, Cilliers follows Morin (2007) in distinguishing 
between restricted complexity and general complexity. 13 Cilliers may state that 
connectionism applies to restricted complexity while post-structuralism applies to general 
complexity. These two domains involve adopting a certain approach or mode of thinking 
towards modelling complex systems. Regarding restricted complexity, says Cilliers, “if you 
work hard enough, with clever enough techniques, you can figure the system out” (2010, 7). 
Conversely, general complexity “requires a more reflexive and transformative approach” 
where we remain sensitive to the recalcitrance of complex systems and the normativity this 
introduces (Cilliers 2010, 7). As Woermann et al put it, 
[i]n the restricted paradigm, complexity is treated as a problem that can be overcome 
(complex problems are understood as complicated problems); whereas in the general 
paradigm, complexity is treated as an ontological fact, which holds certain 
epistemological and cognitive implications for the manner in which we deal with 
complexity (2018, 5). 
In the restricted mode, complex systems are considered to be epistemically complex but 
ontologically simple; in the general mode, complex systems are considered to be both 
epistemically and ontologically complex. Restricted complexity applies to Saussure, 
                                                             
13  Morin’s general complexity/restricted complexity distinction approximately maps onto the more familiar 
complex system/complicated system distinction (see Poli 2013 and Preiser and Woermann 2019). 
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Chomsky and other reductive strategists, while general complexity applies to Derrida and 
likeminded post-structuralists. 
Thus, Cilliers may claim that connectionist models are useful in the restricted mode, while 
post-structural thinking is useful in the general mode, and my dilemma therefore does not 
bite. However, drawing such demarcations is at odds with post-structural themes of 
différance and deconstruction (Derrida 1988; Hurst 2010). As mentioned in the section 1.3, 
différance disrupts all (non-provisional/non-heuristic) distinctions. Post-structuralism 
disallows robust demarcations; all substantial binaries are vulnerable to deconstruction 
(Derrida 1988, 116; Woermann 2016, 173-176). 
Thus, claiming that there are two separate domains – one applicable to connectionism and the 
other applicable to post-structuralism – violates post-structuralism’s own taboo on strict 
demarcations. Cilliers cannot claim that connectionism only applies to restricted complexity. 
This is because the force of différance should disrupt any attempt at isolating or closing off 
some system or domain (Human and Cilliers 2013; Woermann et al 2018, 7-10). On the post-
structuralists’ own account, différance should render connectionist modelling efforts as 
contingent, incomplete and contextual as rule-based efforts. However, as discussed, Cilliers 
does not consider connectionism relativised in this way. Instead, he argues for the superiority 
of connectionist models over rule-based models simpliciter; the correctness of connectionism 
is a putative consequence of Derrida’s semantics. 
Moreover, as we saw in section 1, Cilliers’ advocation of post-structuralism is premised in its 
similarities to connectionism and vice versa. Cilliers therefore cannot claim that post-
structuralism and connectionism apply to separate domains since they would then be 
disanalogous. If post-structuralism and connectionism are distinct, then they cannot support 
each other in the kind of argument by analogy that Cilliers puts forward. 
Lastly, Cilliers may respond that the dilemma at hand is exactly the sort of paradox post-
structuralists revel in. According to Human and Cilliers, we deal with paradox by utilising a 
type of ‘reason’ “defined as a wager between the calculable and the incalculable” (2013, 34); 
the post-structural approach “harbours a somewhat ironic dimension” (Human 2016, 53 fn 9). 
This involves an aporetic logic – a kind of dialethism – premised on différance that embraces 
paradoxes and contradictions (see Derrida 1988, 116; Hurst 2010, 243-246 and Woermann 
2016, 67-81). Here, we must concurrently think both closed and open, both random and 
predictable, p and ∼p, true and false.  
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Perhaps appeal to différance with its aporetic logic dispels all putative dilemmas: precisely 
where there is contradiction there is epistemic illumination. As Woermann states, the 
relationship between the restricted and the general dimensions of complexity is “better 
understood in terms of aporia than unification” (2016, 73). Further, 
[i]n trying to think together the restricted and general dimensions of meaning, 
Derrida’s logic aims to transgress the limitations that our traditional binary logical 
schema (which is necessary restricted) places on us (Woermann 2016, 64). 
However, embracing contradiction to dissolve a dilemma potentially leads to a debilitating 
kind of relativism. It seems that no positive argument can sustain the force of différance. 
Différance ruins all non-aporetic logics – it disrupts meaning, order and structure (Derrida 
1982; Woermann 2016) – and one therefore wonders what kind of statement can actually be 
meaningful or be known. If all positive claims are prone to disruption, then how can there be 
norms of epistemic correctness? Any claim to knowledge introduces a binary between known 
and unknown that should itself be vulnerable to the disruptive power of différance (Derrida 
1988, 116; Woermann 2016, 174-175).14 The result seems to be a version of what Goldman 
(2010) calls nihilistic relativism: there are no non-contextual epistemic norms governing 
which claims are right or wrong or more right or wrong than others.  
Conclusion 
The conclusion to this paper is twofold: 
1. Post-structural complexity theorists cannot advocate for a specific model of 
complex systems. 
2. Conversely, complexity theorists who advocate for a specific model of 
complex systems cannot embrace the post-structural interpretation. 
Regarding 1, to my knowledge, none of the complexity theorists who follow Cilliers’ post-
structural approach currently attempt to develop or advocate for a specific model of complex 
systems.15 As such, my argument here amounts to a warning to these theorists that they 
                                                             
14As solution to this dilemma, Derrida appeals to a kind of mystical moral force in the world that serves as first 
philosophy (see Derrida in Cilliers et al 2016). Cilliers however, does not follow Derrida in this regard. 
15 Woermann does however devote one paragraph to what appears to be an endorsement of neural networks as 
an appropriate model for complex systems (2016, 29). Nonetheless, other than this token gesture, she does not 
argue for connectionism at any length nor attempt to develop her own specific model for complex systems. 
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should not attempt to develop any exclusive model of complex systems in the future. To do 
so would entail falling prey to Cilliers’ dilemma.  
Conclusion 2 however has more pertinent implications. Much of Cilliers’ writings and the 
writings of those who follow his approach are taken up with arguing that complexity theorists 
who adopt the restricted mode of understanding complex systems should be cognisant of the 
general mode. In other words, complexity theorists working in the analytic, reductive 
traditional would do well to embrace a post-structural way of thinking that is sensitive to the 
provisionality, contextuality and contingency involved in modelling complex systems. 
However, if my argument above holds, such potential converts cannot do so without ceasing 
to hold to any specific model they may have already developed or subscribed to. 
Most non-post-structural complexity theorists currently advocate for some preferred 
modelling method. The frontier of the discipline involves methodical testing and engaged 
debate over the best way to model complex systems. These modellers are often post-
structural complexity theorists’ target audience. One wonders however whether these 
modellers are aware that embracing the post-structural mode of thinking will necessitate 
giving up any claims to the objectivity or superiority of their favourite model.  
In sum, those non-post-structural modellers who may find aspects of the post-structural 
approach convincing, and who may be considering adopting it, would do well to note the 
sacrifice their conversion would entail. Likewise, post-structural complexity theorists who 
aim to convince others to embrace the post-structural approach would do well to make 
explicit the sacrifice entailed therein. 
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